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about the prospective interviewing thereby reducing the possibility
of interviewees being duped by cunning interviewers. Thus, upon
the initial contact with interviewees, interviewers should "disclose
[their] representative capacity" 53 and "specify the purpose of the
contact. '54 Interviewees also should be informed of their rights "to
refuse to be interviewed" and "to have their own counsel present. '55 Similarly, the guidelines should proscribe certain types of
inquiries. If interviewers are prohibited from inquiring into "any
matters observed in the course of the employee's performance of
his or her duty" to the corporation,5 6 then the possibility that the
employee will make binding admissions against the corporation
would be reduced. In addition, guidelines that prohibit questions
concerning any communication between the employee and the corporation's counsel regarding the action 57 would minimize the
chance that the attorney-client privilege will be violated.
In summary, the alter ego test seems destined to defeat the
expectations of the court of appeals and the bar at large since it is
simply an amalgamation of problematic tests. Implementing detailed guidelines to effectuate the underlying purposes of the disciplinary rule instead of concocting tests to determine the status of
employees as "parties" would minimize the potential for overreaching, while allowing attorneys to conduct ex parte interviews
with confidence rather than with fear of violating the disciplinary
rule.
Joseph G. Colbert
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(e): Requirement that unwed
parents "live together" as condition to father's right of consent in
adoption of nonmarital child held unconstitutional
Prior to 1980, section 111 of the New York Domestic Relations
Law ("DRL") allowed an unwed mother to place her child up for
" Suggs, No. 86 Civ. 2774, at 24.
5 Id.
51University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (paraphrasing Suggs guidelines).
" Suggs, No. 86 Civ. 2774, at 24.
5, See id.
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adoption without obtaining the father's consent, but granted no
similar right to unwed fathers.' Reasoning that "an unwed father
may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that
of the mother," the United States Supreme Court, in Caban v. Mohammed,2 declared that this gender-based distinction between the
rights of unwed fathers and mothers is unconstitutional.3 As a result, DRL section 111 was amended to require the unwed father's4
consent to the adoption of his child in certain circumstances.
With respect to children under six months old, the amended statute gave an unwed father a right of consent regarding the adoption
1See DRL

§ 111 (McKinney 1977) (current version at DRL § 111 (McKinney 1988)).

This statute provided that "consent to adoption shall be required... [o]f the parents or
surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock; [or] [o]f the mother,
whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock." Id. § 111(b)-(c).
Under New York common law, the biological father of nonmarital children had no
rights with regard to their adoption. See In re Anonymous Adoption, 177 Misc. 683, 683, 31
N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (Sur. Ct. Monroe County 1941) (unwed mother alone has custodial right
of child; biological father has "no rights whatever"). This common-law approach was originally adopted in DRL § 111, which made no reference to the father of a child born out-ofwedlock. See DRL § 111 (McKinney 1977). After 1977, however, an unwed father was entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings in certain circumstances. See DRL § 111-a (McKinney 1988).
In contrast to the father's powerlessness, the unwed mother clearly possessed the authority to prevent the adoption of her child. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385-86
(1979). In fact, an unwed mother's right to consent to her child's adoption was absolute
unless it could be shown that she had abandoned the child, relinquished her rights with
respect to the child, or was adjudicated incompetent to care for the child. Id.
2 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979).
1 Id. at 394. In Caban, the father and mother, Abdiel and Maria, lived together out-ofwedlock for five years, during which time two children were born. Id. at 382. Abdiel was
identified as the father on each child's birth certificate. Id. In addition, Abdiel supported
the children while he lived with them. Id. After separating from Maria, he continued to
keep in touch with and visit the children. Id. at 382-83. Both parents filed for adoption with
their respective new spouses, but because the statute only required the mother's consent,
her petition was granted. Id. at 383. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court struck
down the statute on equal protection grounds. Id. at 394. The Court concluded that
[t]he effect of New York's classification is to discriminate against unwed fathers
even when their identity is known and they have manifested a significant paternal
interest in the child.... Section 111 both excludes some loving fathers from full
participation in the decision whether their' children will be adopted, and. at the
same time, enables some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut off the paternal
rights of fathers.
Id.
" See Magovern, Legislative Changes in Adoption Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15,
1980, at 1, col. 2 (summarizing changes in statute). The statute was amended to provide a
"reasonable, unambiguous and objective" standard to determine when a father has maintained a "substantial relationship" with his child sufficient to accord him the veto right.
Memorandum of Sen. Pisani, reprinted in [1980] N.Y. LEGIs. ANN. 242-43.
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of his nonmarital child if he (1) openly lived with the child or the
child's mother for a continuous period of six months immediately
preceding the placement of the child for adoption ("living together" requirement), (2) openly acknowledged paternity of the
child, and (3) paid a reasonable amount of the pregnancy and birth
expenses in accordance with his means.' Recently, however, in In
re Raquel Marie X.6 ("Raquel Marie"), the New York Court of
Appeals held that the "living together" requirement in DRL section 111(1)(e) was unconstitutional on due process and equal pro7
tection grounds.

5 DRL § 111(1)(e) (McKinney 1988). Section 111(1)(e) provides in pertinent part that

consent to adoption shall be required ...
(e)[o]f the father, whether adult or infant, of a child born out-of-wedlock who is
under the age of six months at the time he is placed for adoption, but only if: (i)
such father openly lived with the child or child's mother for a continuous period
of six months immediately preceding the placement of the child for adoption; and
(ii) such father openly held himself out to be the father of such child during such
period; and (iii) such father paid a fair and reasonable sum, in accordance with his
means, for the medical, hospital and nursing expenses incurred in connection with
the mother's pregnancy or with the birth of the child.
Id.
With respect to a nonmarital child placed with adoptive parents more than six months
after birth, § 111(1)(d) requires the father's consent to adoption if
[the adult or infant] father shall have maintained substantial and continuous or
repeated contact with the child as manifested by: (i)the payment by the father
toward the support of the child of a fair and reasonable sum, according to the
father's means, and either (ii) the father's visiting the child at least monthly when
physically and financially able to do so and not prevented from doing so by the
person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child, or (iii) the father's
regular communication with the child or with the person or agency having the care
or custody of the child, when physically and financially unable to visit the child or
prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody
of the child.
Id.
e 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 517 (1990).
Id. at 407, 559 N.E.2d at 427, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 864. The case was decided under the
United States Constitution; the New York State Constitution was therefore not considered.
Id. at 396, 559 N.E.2d at 421, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
In deciding whether a gender-based classification violates the equal protection clause,
the Supreme Court has held that a court must determine whether the classification serves
an important governmental objective and whether the classification is substantially related
to the achievement of this objective. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. R.v. 1, 34 (1972) (discussing introduction of
strict scrutiny test in equal protection cases). In considering adoption laws, the Supreme
Court has held that a distinction on the basis of gender is not necessarily unconstitutional:
"If one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent
has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does
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Raquel Marie involved two cases on appeal, In re Raquel
Marie X. and In re Baby Girl S.s In both cases, the biological
father of a nonmarital infant sought to invalidate an adoption that
only the child's mother had approved.' 0 Neither father, however,
was able to demonstrate that he had lived with the child's mother
during the requisite statutory period." In Raquel Marie X., the
Westchester Family Court held that the relationship between the
child's parents was "sufficiently continuous" to satisfy the statutory requirement, 12 but was reversed by the Appellate Division,
Second Department. 13 In Baby Girl S., the Appellate Division,
not prevent a State from according the two parents different legal rights." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983).
Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Lehr, several states have upheld even more
restrictive standards than DRL § 111(1)(e). See, e.g., Adoption of Baby Doe, 492 So. 2d 508,
511 (La. Ct. App.) (unwed father has right to be heard on best interests of child, but did not
have the power to defeat adoption by withholding consent), cert. denied, 496 So. 2d 353 (La.
1986); In re Karen A.B., 513 A.2d 770, 772 (Del. 1986) (upholding statute allowing for determination of father's parental rights when mother refuses to disclose his identity); Shoecraft
v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, 222 Neb. 574, 580, 385 N.W.2d 448, 452 (1986) (upholding
statute requiring only mother's consent unless unwed father files notice of intent to claim
paternity within five days of birth). For a discussion of the Raquel Marie court's constitutional analysis of DRL § 111(1)(e), see infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
8 150 A.D.2d 23, 545 N.Y.S.2d 379 (2d Dep't 1989), rev'd, 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d
418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 517 (1990).
0 150 A.D.2d 993, 543 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1st Dep't 1989) (per curiam), aft'd, 76 N.Y.2d 387,
559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 517 (1990).
10 Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 394-96, 559 N.E.2d at 420, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 857 (father's
consent not obtained). In each case the father appeared at least arguably to have met the
other two statutory requirements. See id. at 408-09, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
In In re Baby Girl S., the surrogate found that prior to the child's birth, the father made
repeated offers of support and also filed a petition to establish paternity and obtain custody.
In re Baby Girl S., 141 Misc. 2d 905, 907, 535 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1988), afl'd, 150 A.D.2d 993, 543 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1st Dep't 1989) (per curiam), af'd, 76
N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 517 (1990). The
appellate division in Raquel Marie X. did not give the issue full consideration, but said only
that the father provided "little evidence of compliance with [the] requirements." Raquel
Marie X., 150 A.D.2d at 29, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
11Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 394-95, 559 N.E.2d at 419-20, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 856-57.
Shortly after they were born, both children were placed up for adoption by their mothers.
Id. at 395, 559 N.E.2d at 420, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 857. The mothers were both estranged from
the fathers at the time, and neither father was consulted. Id.
12 Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 395, 559 N.E.2d at 420, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
"Raquel Marie X., 150 A.D.2d at 26, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 381. The appellate division characterized the couple's relationship as "turbulent," finding it to be "neither normal nor stable." Id. Furthermore, the court determined that the father had not satisfied the "living
together" requirement and thus had no right to veto the adoption. Id. at 27-29, 545
N.Y.S.2d at 383. The court expressly reserved decision on the issue of whether strict compliance with DRL § 111 was required, id. at 27, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 382-83, but stated that "even
under a relaxed interpretation," the natural father failed to establish a sufficient relation-
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First Department affirmed the determination of the New York
County Surrogate's Court that the "living together" requirement
should be waived since the infant's mother had prevented its fulfillment by denying the father's paternity and refusing his offer of
marriage.

14

After reviewing both cases, the court of appeals concluded
that the DRL's "living together" requirement was unconstitutional 5 in that it neither protected the father's interest in a paternal relationship' s nor legitimately furthered the state's interest in
adoption.' Writing for the court, Judge Kaye recognized that a
father has a constitutionally protected right to the opportunity to
develop a relationship with his newborn baby, provided that he has
promptly availed himself of his chances to form "a legal and emotional bond" with the child.' However, the court also acknowlship. Id. at 29, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
14 Baby Girl S., 150 A.D.2d at 993, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 602. The Surrogate's Court of New
York County determined that the "living together" requirement should be read to include a
"savings clause" so that a mother could not frustrate the unwed father's rights by simply
refusing to live with him. See Baby Girl S., 141 Misc. 2d at 915, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 682. Such a
clause was included by the Legislature in DRL § 111(1)(d), which requires the father's consent for the adoption of his over-six-month-old child, provided that the father has, among
other things, "visit[ed] the child at least monthly when physically and financially able to do
so and not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful
custody of the child." DRL § 111(1)(d) (McKinney 1988) (emphasis added).
15 Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 407, 559 N.E.2d at 427, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 864. In declaring
the statute unconstitutional, the court relied on the short line of United States Supreme
Court cases that have shaped the rights of unwed fathers. Id. at 397-403, 559 N.E.2d at 42125, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 858-62; see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983) (although biological father must be given opportunity to develop relationship with child, opportunity is limited and will be lost if father fails to act promptly); Caban, 441 U.S. at 393
(father who established substantial relationship with child and admitted paternity must be
afforded same right to consent to child's adoption as mother); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 256 (1978) (unwed father who never exercised legal or actual custody and never
shouldered any responsibility for child is entitled to no more than notice and opportunity to
be heard); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (presumption that all unwed fathers
are unfit is unconstitutional).
18 See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 405, 559 N.E.2d at 426, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 863. The
Raquel Marie court referred to the "sense of the parental tie as a fundamental interest." Id.
at 397, 559 N.E.2d at 421, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 858. The Supreme Court has referred to "[t]he
rights to conceive and raise one's children ...
[as] 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,' and
'rights far more precious . . . than property rights.'" Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (citations
omitted). According to the Court, an unwed father at the very least possesses an inchoate
interest in the opportunity to develop a relationship with the child. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at
262.
17 See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
"8 See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 401-02, 559 N.E.2d at 424, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 861; see
also Caban, 441 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("relationship between a father and his
natural child is entitled to protection against arbitrary state action as a matter of due
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edged the state's compelling interest in facilitating the prompt
adoption of infants whose parents are either unwilling or unable to
provide them with emotional and financial support. 19
process").
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a man does not acquire any
absolute rights upon the birth of his child. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. The Supreme Court declared that "the mere existence of a biological link does not merit... constitutional protection," id., and that "[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring." Id. at 260 (quoting
Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
The New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that "[t]he unwed father's protected
interest requires both a biological connection and full parental responsibility; he must both
be a father and behave like one," Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 401, 559 N.E.2d at 424, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 861, since the biological link affords a father no more than an opportunity to
develop a relationship with the child. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. But see id. at 271-72
(White, J., dissenting) (rejecting "peculiar notion" that biological connection offers no more
than opportunity interest).
To protect his interest, the father must "grasp the opportunity" and develop a relationship with the child in order to acquire parental rights deserving constitutional protection.
See id. at 262. An unwed father who develops and maintains a substantial and continuous
relationship with the child is entitled to the same substantive rights accorded an unwed
mother and thus has the right to block an adoption and object to the termination of his
parental rights. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 389; see also DRL § 111(1)(d) (McKinney 1988)
(such relationship is manifested by father's payments to support child and either visitation
or communication with child).
Those fathers who fail to qualify for substantive rights under the "substantial relationship" test may still have certain due process rights under the notice provisions of DRL §
111-a (McKinney 1988). This section provides for a hearing on the "best interests of the
child" and for notification of the adoption proceedings to the person identified as the father
on the child's birth certificate, any person openly living with the mother and child at the
time of placement who claims to be the father, any person who has registered with the
putative father's registry acknowledging paternity, and any person who has filed a timely
and unrevoked petition to claim paternity. Id.; see also Comment, Lehr v. Robertson: Unwed Fathersand Adoption-How Much ProcessIs Due?, 7 HARv. Wo

EsN's

L.J. 265, 265 n.4

(1984) (procedural due process requirement enables father to present evidence of child's
best interest).
19 See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 406, 559 N.E.2d at 426, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 863 (state
has "significant interest" in "ensuring swift, permanent placement"). The state's interest in
children is that of parens patriae-thestate fills the shoes of the child's parents and is
responsible for assuring the best interests of the child. See Marcus, Equal Protection: The
Custody of the Illegitimate Child, 11 J. FAM. L. 1, 7 (1971).
The Supreme Court has said that the state has an interest in adoption because it not
only provides children with stability, but also helps to remove the stigma of illegitimacy. See
Caban, 441 U.S. at 391. Swift adoption procedures have been termed "essential" to minimize the potential for psychological harm to the child that can result from repeated changes
in environment. See Comment, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: ProvidingNotice of
Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REv. 517, 523-24 (1973); see also J.
GoLDsTEIN, A. FREuD & A.J. SoLMrr, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 40 (1979)
(noting necessity of continuity of care for proper development of child).
For similar reasons, the state also has an interest in assuring the finality of adoption.
See Memorandum of the Attorney General, reprinted in [1985] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 333. "Fi-
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Reconciling these competing concerns, the court reasoned that
while the state may impose certain "conditions" on an unwed father's right to develop his parental interest, 20 the "living together"
requirement was not sufficiently related to the father-child relanality in adoption proceedings is highly desirable in order to establish stability and permanency in the lives of the children affected; as such, finality is the public policy of the State."
Id.
One commentator concluded that "[t]he state interest in promoting the adoption procedure is highest when the child is newborn, for that is the preferred age for adoptions and
the category comprising the bulk of adoptions." See Comment, Caban v. Mohammed: Extending the Rights of Unwed Fathers, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 95, 115 (1979) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Comment, Unwed Fathers].
20 See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 404, 559 N.E.2d at 425, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 862. The
court declared that the state may deny unwed fathers the right to consent if their attempts
at assuming "parental responsibilities" are not "sufficiently prompt and substantial" to warrant constitutional protection. Id. See generally Note, Unwed Fathers and the Adoption
Process,22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 85, 135-37 (1980) (recommendations for recognizing constitutionally sufficient relationship).
The Raquel Marie court determined that the state's authority to impose conditions on
an unwed father's right to establish a relationship with the child is grounded in its right "to
promote its own substantial interests." See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 404, 559 N.E.2d at
425, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 862. Since the state's interest in adoptions is strongest in the case of
newborns, see Comment, Unwed Fathers, supra note 19, and because it is impossible to
establish a "substantial" father-child relationship with a newborn, the state has the authority to distinguish the rights of unwed fathers of newborns from those of older children. See
Caban, 441 U.S. at 392-93. In either case, however, the focus is on whether the unwed father
is concerned for the child and interested in the child's development; his parental conduct is
relevant in making that determination. See Note, supra, at 136.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Caban, it became apparent that an unwed father
who had established a substantial relationship with an older child was to be afforded the
same right to consent to the child's adoption as was given an unwed mother. See Caban, 441
U.S. at 393. However, two interpretations have emerged regarding the scope of the Court's
holding in Caban. See Carrieri, New Issues Raised in Aftermath of "Caban," N.Y.L.J., Aug.
2, 1979, at 1, col. 1. The first is a narrow construction that recognizes the right to consent
only in the cases of unwed fathers of older children. See Caban,441 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 398-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (unwed mothers and fathers are
not similarly situated with respect to newborns). The Caban majority lent authority to this
interpretation by noting that "[e]ven if the special difficulties attendant upon locating and
identifying unwed fathers at birth would justify a legislative distinction between mothers
and fathers of newborns, these difficulties need not persist past infancy." Id. at 392 (footnote omitted). The second, broader interpretation refuses to confine the application of
Caban to school-age children and instead extends the right of consent to all unwed fathers.
See In re "R" Children, 100 Misc. 2d 248, 250, 418 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (Family Ct. N.Y.
County 1979) (interpreting Caban as having "categorically destroyed the sex-oriented base
for consent of unwed mothers in adoption[s]").
After rejecting proposals to give the right to consent equally to unwed fathers of children of all ages, the New York Legislature opted for a legislative distinction and drafted a
statute with criteria for unwed fathers of newborns different from the criteria for unwed
fathers of a child over six months old. See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 399, 559 N.E.2d at
422, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 859; see also supra note 5 (setting forth pertinent portions of DRL
§ 111(1)(d) & (e)).
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tionship to withstand constitutional scrutiny.21 The court feared
that the requirement could easily be used to defeat the father's
rights, permitting the adoption of his newborn infant despite his
objections and attempts to form a "substantial, continuous, and
meaningful" relationship with the child.22 Consequently, the court,
noting the significance of the "living together" requirement in the
legislative plan, declared that it had "no recourse but to declare
section 111(1)(e) unconstitutional in its entirety.

' 23

Judge Kaye recognized the need to establish substitute criteria
for determining the rights of unwed fathers in pending adoption
proceedings.24 The court thus proposed an interim standard based
upon the father's manifestation of paternal responsibility during
the six-month period prior to the child's placement for adoption. 2s
According to the court, the unwed father must be willing to assume
full custody of the child to qualify for a right of consent.26 In addition, Judge Kaye noted that due weight should be given to the unchallenged portions of DRL section 111(1)(e), namely public acknowledgement of paternity and payment of reasonable pregnancy
and birth expenses."
21 See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 405-06, 559 N.E.2d at 426, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 863. The
court believed that the "living together" requirement provided an erroneous basis for evaluating parental concern because it focused on the father-mother relationship rather than the
father-child relationship. Id. at 406, 559 N.E.2d at 426, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
22 See id. at 405, 559 N.E.2d at 426, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 863. The court speculated that if
the unwed father and mother were living together for the six months preceding the birth, a
conflict over the question of adoption would be unlikely. Id. at 406, 559 N.E.2d at 426, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 863. Impliedly, the concern is that the mother, by refusing to live with the
father, could unilaterally terminate the father's rights. Id.
23 Id. at 407, 559 N.E.2d at 427, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
2'See id. at 407-08, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65.
25 Id. at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 865. Judge Kaye noted that during this
interim period, "the courts will be guided by principles gleaned from Supreme Court decisions." Id.
26 See id. In Raquel Marie, the court remarked that a commitment to custody signifies
"provision for the [children's] physical and emotional needs... provision of guidance and
direction.., and living with [the] children on a day-to-day basis." Id. at 401, 559 N.E.2d at
424, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 861 (quoting Buchanan, The ConstitutionalRights of Unwed Fathers
Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 313, 350 (1984)). When this type of
relationship exists between an unwed father and his child, the father is entitled at least to
the same treatment as is accorded to unwed mothers who have custodial relationships with
their children. See id. The Supreme Court has recognized that when an unwed father has
not sought, at any time, actual or legal custody of his child, his rights to develop a relationship with that child may be denied. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
27 See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 865. The
court also stated that courts should consider "steps taken [by the unwed father] to establish
legal responsibility for the child, and other factors evincing a commitment to the child." Id.
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Faced with a difficult decision in a sensitive area of the law,
the Raquel Marie court reached an equitable result and has provided unwed fathers with greater opportunity to establish a paternal relationship with their nonmarital children.28 As a practical
matter, however, declaring DRL section 111(1)(e) unconstitutional
in its entirety will likely cause unreasonable delays in adoption
proceedings because of the inevitable struggles by courts and child
welfare agencies in determining whether an unwed father's consent
is required under the interim standard.2
As noted by Judge Kaye, it is "the prerogative of the Legislature, not the courts," to promulgate a new standard for assessing
an unwed father's rights.30 Efforts must therefore be directed towards urging legislators to move quickly in drafting a replacement
statute containing clear and objective criteria. In amending section
111(1)(e), the New York Legislature should preserve those portions
of the statute that the court of appeals endorsed: (1) whether the
It should be noted that, in applying the interim standard to the facts of Baby Girl S.,
the court found that the unwed father's consent was required in the adoption of his
nonmarital child. See id. at 408-09, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 865. Judge Kaye
reasoned that the unwed father in Baby Girl S. sought full custody of the child "virtually
from the time he learned of [the unwed mother's] pregnancy, [and] did everything possible
to manifest and establish his parental responsibility." Id. at 409, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 865.
However, with respect to Raquel Marie, the court held that the case must be "remitted
to the Appellate Division for further review of the facts." Id. On remand, the Appellate
Division, Second Department found that the record failed to show that the unwed father in
Raquel Marie X. manifested adequate parental responsibility to establish his right to consent under the interim standard. See In re Raquel Marie X., 570 N.Y.S.2d 604, 605 (2d
Dep't 1991). The Appellate Division therefore stated that the unwed father was "not entitled to constitutional protection" of his parental interest and that "his consent to the adoption [wa]s not needed." Id. at 608.
28 See Recent Developments-FamilyLaw-Unwed Father'sRights-New York Court
of Appeals Mandates Veto Power over Newborn's Adoption for Unwed Father Who Demonstrates Parental Responsibility, 104 HARv. L. REv. 800, 803-07 (1991) (Raquel Marie
court "achieved a sound result").
19 See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 407, 559 N.E.2d at 427, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 864. At the
time DRL § 111 was first declared unconstitutional in 1979, see Caban, 441 U.S. at 394,
there were often long delays in adoption proceedings. See Letter of New York State Catholic Conf. to Governor's Counsel (June 19, 1980), reprinted in Legis. Bill Jacket, ch. 575,
N.Y. Laws (June 26, 1980) ("confusion in the courts created by section 111 of the Domestic
Relations Law being vacated by the Supreme Court has caused great delays in the adoption
process for out of wedlock children"). The New York Legal Aid Society complained that the
statutory void "needlessly delayed and impeded the adoption proceedings," and noted that
"without legislative guidance, the courts have gone too far, requiring notice to and consent
from fathers who have not manifested the slightest interest in their children." Id.
30 See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 407-08, 559 N.E.2d at 427-28, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 864-
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father is willing and able to assume legal custody of the child;"1
and (2) whether the father has paid a fair and reasonable amount
of the pregnancy and birth expenses in accordance with his
means.3 2 In addition, the Legislature would do well to require the
father to file a notice of paternity with the state department of
social services within the first twenty days after the child's birth."3
In contrast to the "living together" requirement, which focused on
8 See In re Benjamin, 93 Misc. 2d 1084, 1088, 403 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.

County 1978) (natural father who has not visited his child nor provided support may lose
right of consent based upon finding of abandonment). Thus, as stated in Raquel Marie, a
court deciding whether to grant a petition of adoption should consider any waiver or abandonment on the part of the unwed father, just as they would whenever custody is in issue.
See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (citing In re
Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976)).
It is important to note that a finding of capability to assume custody should not necessarily entail a "best interest of the child" test as applied when natural rights are not in issue
(e.g., custody battle between the natural parents). The "best interest of the child" test is
stricter and more subjective than should be required to meet the proposed statute. See generally In re Anonymous, 92 Misc. 2d 25, 27-28, 399 N.Y.S.2d 418, 420 (Sur. Ct. Erie County
1977) (discussing subjectivity of "best interests of the child" test).
32 See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 865. The
Raquel Marie court acknowledged that the remaining requirements of DRL § 111(1)(e),
unchallenged in the case, were relevant factors in the analysis of the unwed father's manifestation of parental responsibility. Id. These requirements should remain important yardsticks for measuring the unwed father's commitment to his child under the proposed
statute.
33 In order to facilitate the state's interest in expediting the adoption of young children,
any father who fails to file timely notice of paternity should be barred from bringing any
action asserting an interest to develop a relationship with the child. However, because circumstances may arise that make it impossible for the father to fie notice, the statute should
allow an unwed father to prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) that it was not possible
for him to file within the time specified, (2) that his failure to file notice was through no
fault of his own, and (3) that he filed within ten days after it became possible for him to file.
A number of states have granted the right to consent to unwed fathers on condition
that they file notice of paternity within specified time limits. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 43-104.02(1) (1989) (notice must be filed within five days after birth of child); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-30-4.8 (1991) (notice must be filed prior to time child is relinquished to adoption
agency). Other states require that the unwed father have established paternity prior to the
adoption proceeding if he does not have custody of the child, see ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-9-206(a)(2) (1991), or simply require the consent of both natural parents. See Aiuz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (1990).
Although upholding the constitutionality of Nebraska's filing requirement, the Nebraska Supreme Court cautioned that the Nebraska statute did not require "notification to
the father of the birth of the child." Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Serva. Bureau, 222 Neb.
574, 578, 385 N.W.2d 448, 451 (1986). "That omission might well, in a particular case,
render constitutionally suspect as violative of due process the termination of the father's
rights." Id. (citing Caban). Unlike Nebraska's statute, DRL § 111-a requires that the father
receive notice "at least twenty days prior to the [adoption] proceeding." DRL § 111-a(4)
(McKinney 1988).
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the father's relationship with the mother, 34 a filing requirement
properly emphasizes the father's efforts to "establish legal respon'3 5
sibility for the child" as well as his "commitment to the child.
Thus, such a requirement would both further the strong state interest in promoting swift adoptions and sufficiently protect the unwed father's interest in developing a relationship with his child. 6
Eileen A. Powers

3' See Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d at 405, 559 N.E.2d at 425, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
3. Id.
at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
" See supra notes 19, 26-27 and accompanying text.

